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#### Glossary

AOG	Armed Opposition Group
FSA	Free Syrian Army
GoT	Government of Turkey
GoS	Government of Syria
GoR	Government of Russia
INGO	International non-Government Agency
IS	Islamic State
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IRC	International Rescue Committee
KSA	Kurdish Self-Administration
PYD	Democratic Union Party (Political wing of YPG and leading political party in Hasaka's 'Self-Administration')
YPG	Peoples Protection Unit
SDF	Syrian Democratic Force (mostly made up of and led by YPG forces, approximately 10% are from Arab tribes)
SDC	Syria Democratic Council (political wing of the SDF)
SLF	Syria Liberation Front (Arabic - Jabhat Tahrir Suriya, is an alliance of 'moderate' AOGs, notably Ahrar Al-Sham and Nourredine Al-Zinki)
HTS	Hay'at Tahrir al Sham (alliance of 'extreme' AOGs, notably Jabhat al-Nusra)

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Sources of information include Mercy Corp Humanitarian Access Team (MC HAT), INSO, and websites including, but not exclusive, Institute for the Study of War, Chatham House, Human Rights Watch, Al Jazeera, SouthFront, Rudaw, and Al-Monitor.


In the text when '*Comment: ...*' appears in *italic* and the subsequent text is also in *italic*, this information is not fact, but the opinion of the author.

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## 1. Conflict and Security (Map source <http://syriancivilwarmap.com>)

**MANBIJ WITHDRAWAL** – The US Secretary of State and GoT Foreign Minister met on 4 June 2018 & agreed to jointly administer the security and stability of Manbij. The following day, the Kurdish YPG announced the withdrawal of its military advisers from Manbij. Later the GoT announced the agreement was a 6-month road map that included the withdrawal & disarmament of the YPG in Manbij. However, the Manbij Military Council, a non-Kurdish armed group within the SDF, announced it would not accept a Turkish military presence in the town. *Comment: The details of the US-Turkey Manbij agreement are not yet clear, but does seem to involve the voluntary removal of Kurdish YPG forces, considered terrorists by the GoT. However, the continued presence of Non-Kurdish elements of the SDF, notably the Manbij Military Council, and the statement from the US & GoT about jointly ensuring the security & stability of the town, suggests the US will have some role to play & the GoT will not assume full control. For the SDF to withdrawal its forces to the east bank of the Euphrates makes strategic sense. It straightens their front line with Turkish forces & the river provides a natural barrier.*

**ANTI-KURDISH RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS** – In early June 2018 the formation of “The Popular Tribal Resistance” was announced following a meeting between the GoS head of General Intelligence Branch and Arab tribal leaders from across north & east Syria. The new group is in opposition to the presence of foreign forces in Syria without GoS approval, notably U.S., French, and Turkey. *Comment: Evidently from its ties with GoS Intelligence, the Popular Tribal Resistance is a GoS controlled militia whose role will be to undermine Turkey’s presence in Afrin & north Aleppo, and the Kurdish Self-Administration. Through this Arab group the GoS hopes to tap into the growing discontent amongst the Arab population in regions controlled by the Kurdish Self-Administration. Arabs are marginalized & underrepresented in the governance structures. Additionally, conscription into the SDF is deeply unpopular, security crackdowns disproportionately target Arab constituencies, and there are numerous disputes over policy issues such as education. Other resistance movements currently conducting attacks against the Self-Administration forces are the Lions of Popular Resistance, the Eastern Syria Popular Resistance, and the Ar-Raqqa Popular Resistance. All probably receive backing from the GoS.*



**FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE KURDISH SELF-ADMINISTRATION & GoS** – In early June 2018 the political wing of the SDF, the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), announced it was ready for unconditional peace talks with the GoS. *Comment: It's not clear the power & influence the SDC has in the PYD led Kurdish Self-Administration, and if the statement was representative of the Self-Administration. However, the Self-Administration will probably have to negotiate with the GoS on its future form. GoS President Assad has stated on several occasions that the Self-Administration must negotiate or face a military offensive. Whilst an offensive is currently unlikely, the GoS is presently preparing for offensives on either Idlib governorate or the southwest centred around Dara, the Kurdish Self-Administration is increasingly finding itself pressured by several events that are pushing it towards negotiation:*

- *The SDF forces are stretched across an area which is proving too large for them to secure and control.*
- *IED attacks on & assassinations of SDF and internal security personnel are increasing, as are the number of Arab resistance groups, see text box above.*
- *US President Trump has stated American troops will pull-out of region in a few months.*
- *Turkey, after its successful military operation against the SDF in Afrin, is threatening the larger Self-Administration controlled areas.*



- Syrian Government (Syrian Arab Army and allies)
- Islamic State
- Armed Opposition Groups (Ahrar al-Sham and other AOG)
- Armed Opposition Group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham
- SDF/YPG
- Turkish Army and AOGs
- Israel occupied Golan Heights
- Syrian Democratic Forces and Russia

**AIRSTRIKES IN IDLIB** – Between 8 & 11 June 2018 GoS and probably GoR military aircraft conducted airstrikes against several AOG held villages to the northeast of Idlib city. Its reported 44 people were killed in one village, 16 killed & 18 injured in another, and 60 injured in a third. The airstrikes were the largest conducted in 2018. The attacked villages are close to besieged GoS held villages of Foua & Kefraya that are home to some 10,000 Shia Muslims. In response to the airstrikes HTS launched a limited ground offensive on Foua and Kefraya on 10 June.

**GoT MILITARY OPERATIONS IN IDLIB, SYRIA** – During May 2018 the GoT's involvement in the opposition enclave in the northwest of Syria, encompassing Idlib governorate, west-rural Aleppo, and northern Hama, grew and became more complex.

- Turkish military established several more Observation Posts in west-rural Aleppo and the eastern border of Idlib governorate. GoT has now all 12 Observation Posts detailed in the de-escalation zone agreement with Russia & Iran.
- A new alliance of 10 armed AOG in northwest Syria was formed called 'National Liberation Front' & will comprise of an estimated 50,000 fighters. It is reported the alliance will receive direct funding from the GoT.
- GoT has reportedly requested the disbanding of HTS in the next 2 months.
- Reportedly, as part of the de-escalation process agreed between Turkey, Russia & Iran, GoS forces will withdraw from front line positions close to Turkish observation posts in northern Hama & eastern Idlib governorates & be replaced with Russian Police. Similarly, it's claimed the GoS will hand over other areas on the border to GoT supported armed opposition groups, probably the newly formed National Liberation Front. In return, the Government of Turkey will commit to ending the presence of extremist AOGs in Idlib and northern Hama, notably HTS.


*Comment: On 14 & 15 May was the 9<sup>th</sup> round of the Astana talks between the governments of Turkey, Russia & Iran. It seems much more was discussed there than was reported at the time. It seems likely that final plans for Turkey's greater involvement in the opposition held northwest was finalized. This is a high risk strategy for the GoT, much depends on them disbanding the AOGs considered extremists, notably HTS but also others aligned with al Qaeda. Not all will voluntary disband and fighting is highly likely between the extremist AOGs & Turkish supported AOGs.*

*It seems unlikely that GoS forces will launch an offensive on Idlib & northern Hama, now that GoT forces and its aligned AOGs will soon occupy much of the enclave's borders. Here probably lays a main driver behind Turkey's involvement in Idlib. Turkey already hosts over 2.5 million Syrian refugees. In Idlib there is an estimated 2.3 million people, half of them IDPs. Should there be a Syrian offensive on the opposition held enclave, many of these people would be displaced to Turkey, putting further pressure on the GoT & Turkey's economy – prior to an election. Controlling the northwest enclave will also allow Turkey to relocate some of the Syrian refugees from Turkey.*

## 2. Activities elsewhere in Syria (Map source <http://syriancivilwarmap.com>)

**M5 HIGHWAY** – On 6 June 2018, the GoS opened the Hama-Homs M5 highway after last months reconciliation agreements with AOGs in northern rural Homs. *Comment: The highway is of critical economic, military, and symbolic importance, it links the major population centres from the Jordanian border to Aleppo. The sections running through Idlib governorate and the small section from the southern city Dar'a to the Nasib border crossing with Jordan, are the only sections remaining in opposition hands. The opening also facilitates the establishment of new Russian observation points in Homs and Hama governorates.*

**DETENTION & ASSASSINATION CAMPAIGN** – Since mid-May 2018 there has been an assassination and detention campaign waged against reconciliation committee members from various committees in Dar'a & Sweida governorates. On the 10 June alone, media sources reported that unknown armed groups had killed at least 11 members over the past week. Despite this threat, negotiations are nevertheless ongoing in many communities. *Comment: Which AOGs are conducting the campaign is not clear. The desire to negotiate local reconciliation agreements by some community leaders to avoid a GoS offensive, has divided the leaders in southern Syria into pro- and anti-reconciliation camps. These divisions have manifested in the detention and, in some cases, the killing of reconciliation committee members. Regardless, reconciliation negotiations are likely to continue both prior to and during the anticipated offensive.*






# 2018 Syria Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) FUNDING OVERVIEW

AS OF 13 JUNE 2018

Source: Financial Tracking Service (FTS)




FUNDING REQUIREMENTS	FUNDING RECEIVED	TOTAL PLEDGES
<b>US\$ 3.51 BILLION</b>	<b>US\$ 948.3 MILLION</b>	<b>US\$ 46.7 MILLION</b>

UNMET REQUIREMENTS **US\$ 2.57 BILLION**


## BY SECTOR (US\$)

Sector/Cluster	% Covered	Funding Received	Requirements
Food security	16.3%	207.7M	1.3B
Shelter/NFI	4.2%	22.1M	532.7M
Health	14.3%	63M	441.9M
Protection	8.8%	29.3M	333.8M
Education	31.8%	89.4M	281.2M
WASH	16.4%	46M	279.5M
Early Recovery and Livelihoods	16.9%	31.8M	187.7M
Nutrition	29.9%	21.2M	70.7M
Coordination	19%	11M	57.9M
Camp coordination and camp management	8.6%	3.7M	43.2M
Logistics	55.4%	6.8M	12.3M
Emergency Telecommunications	8.6%	71.4K	831.4K
Not reported		392M	-
Multiple Field clusters (shared)		14M	-
Multi-sector		10.3M	-

## BY ORGANIZATION TYPE



## BY DONOR (TOP 10 DONORS) (US\$)



## PLEDGES (US\$)

