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Glossary

IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
INGO	International Non-Government Organisation
IS	Islamic State
KRG	Kurdish Regional Government
KR	Kurdish Region
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
PKK	Kurdistan Workers Party
PMU	Popular Mobilization Units (Government created militia formed into units based on ethnicity and religion).
SGBV	Sexual & Gender Based Violence
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
HNO	Humanitarian Needs Overview

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
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Locations	Risk Level	<i>Comment</i>	<i>Forecast</i>
Erbil, Duhok, Sulaymaniyah, Zokho and routes between the cities but within the KRG borders (except those areas assessed as High).	Low	<i>Improving relations between KRG and Iraq's central government, continued effectiveness of KRG security forces and few incidents involving INGOs enables the Risk Level to be lowered from Moderate to Low.</i>	<i>*Turkish military & PKK clashes will continue, as will Turkish airstrikes. *Continued political tensions in Sinjar. *Main threats to INGOs are SGBV incidents in Erbil and road traffic accidents.</i>
Kirkuk Governorate, Hawijah Governorate, Mosel, Telafar, Sinjar Districts, within 10km of Turkey and Iran border.	High	<i>INGOs are operating in these areas & international staff do visit. However, strong Security Operating Procedures, Contingency Plans & well trained competent staff are essential. Agencies must also have a high risk threshold and strong resilience.</i>	<i>*No improvements in the poor security of the listed locations is expected for the near to medium future. *Harassment of INGO staff likely to increase as INGOs areas of operations grow. *Risk Levels will most probably remain high.</i>

1. Political and Conflict Summary

(Map Source <http://syriancivilwarmap.com>)

- Government of Iraq (GoI)
- Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)
- PPK active areas
- Yezidi YBS active areas



NGO INCIDENTS – In Jan 2019 INGOs continued to have access and implantation issues. Local armed actors imposed their own unofficial document access requirements on top of those stipulated by the central government. Additionally, NGOs and INGOs experienced the following incidents:

- An INGO office in Mosul was broken into and robbed. There were no staff or guards present at the time.
- In a town 25 km south of Mosul an NGO camp guard was arrested on false charges and assaulted by local police. The guard was released after the NGO liaised with senior commanders. The local police commander involved was subsequently reprimanded.
- In a town 15 km east of Mosul an INGO had to stop registration after a large crowd from surrounding villages forced access to the agency's local office. Staff had to leave and abandon the registration.
- In Hawija an INGO vehicle was hit by an object, believed to be a bullet. No one was injured.

Comment: The increase in incidents over recent months is partially due to INGO operational areas expanding and many armed actors having no knowledge and understanding of the role of INGOs/NGOs and of humanitarian principles.


ARREST OF ISLAMIC STATE SUSPECTS IN KURDISH REGION

– In Dec 2018, security forces in the KR arrested several IS militants in Sulaymaniyah who, allegedly, had been planning attacks in the KR as well as Kirkuk and Diyala. In Jan 2019, security forces arrested a further 2 suspects in Erbil and 1 in Chamchamal, a town halfway between Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk. All were described as militants who had fought and fled Mosul. In Erbil 6 others were detained for suspected terrorist activities. *Comment: Much of the KR has been spared the terrorist violence experienced by the rest of Iraq; two exceptions being the attack on government buildings in Erbil by several gunmen in Jul 2018 and the IED attack on the US consulate in the city in 2015. The KR security forces can probably be credited with ensuring IS ineffectiveness in the region. However, now that IS has been beaten on the battlefield and the group moves into asymmetric warfare the risk of further terrorist attacks in the KR, specifically Erbil, is likely to increase.*

FLIGHTS BETWEEN SULAYMANIYAH AND TURKEY RESUME

– Flights between Sulaymaniyah International Airport and Turkey resumed on 26 Jan 2019. Following the KRG's referendum on independence in Sept 2017, air travel bans to Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports were imposed. Flights to Erbil International Airport resumed in Mar 2018. *Comment: Its widely reported that the Government of Turkey only agreed to the opening on condition that the local authorities in Sulaymaniyah clamped down on PKK affiliated organisations and supporters. This was evident in Nov and Dec 2018 and continued into 2019 with the arrest of an unknown number of individuals and the closure of offices of local organisation associated with the PKK and their aims.*

- Government of Iraq (GoI)
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- PKK active areas
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NEW BORDER CUSTOMS AGREEMENTS

In mid-Jan 2019 the KRG and Iraqi central government came to an agreement to standardise tariffs at internal border crossings to facilitate smooth movement of goods. The need for the Iraqi government to impose controls at the crossings came about because the KRG controls all of Iraq's border with Turkey and a length of the frontier with Iran, and the central government believes it is entitled to revenues from the international crossings. Even though this issue has been resolved between the 2 governments, local administrations and armed actors continue to collect local tariffs at some crossings. *Comment: This is another example of improving relations between the governments in Bagdad and Erbil.*

VIOLENT PROTESTS AGAINST TURKEY'S AIRSTRIKES IN NORTH IRAQ

In 2018, Turkey's military conducted approx. 350 airstrikes against PKK targets in the mountainous areas of north and northeast Iraq. This level of activity continued into 2019, but 3 airstrikes in Jan 2019 resulted in the death of 7 civilians and another 2 are missing. The civilians were fishing or bee keeping at the time and 5 were, reportedly, members of the KRG security forces.

On 26 Jan locals protesting about the deaths and marched on a Turkish military post in Sheladze Town, Dohuk Governorate. The protest turned violent and protestors broke into the military compound burning several vehicles and buildings, including an armoury. In attempts to disperse the crowd Turkish soldiers fired weapons in the air, but killed 2 protestors. Turkish jets also flew low overhead attempting to intimidate the crowd. Whilst Iraq's central government condemned the Turkish military for the killing of protestors, the KRG blamed the PKK for the incidents. *Comment: The KRG stance on this issue reflects how the KRG is increasingly acting against the PKK and fostering it relations with Turkey.*

IRAQ'S PARLIAMENT APPROVE NEW BUDGET

On 24 Jan, Iraq's parliament approved a much-amended state budget for 2019, after weeks of disagreement. The budget, at \$112 billion, is a 27% increase over the previous year. It includes a reconstruction fund for areas liberated from IS, and \$28 billion for investment projects throughout the country. The budget will also pay for the salaries of the KR's Peshmerga forces, increase the KR's share from 12.67% to 13.93% and give the region \$2 billion in investment loans. It also allocates funding to the recruitment of an additional 6,500 fighters into Shia PMUs.

However, the budget contravenes an agreement with the International Monetary Fund that would have increased taxes and frozen government salaries.

Comment: It is expected the implementation of the budget will be held up for a couple of months as the Government and Southern governorates contest Parliaments amendments in the high court.

2. Humanitarian Situation

KEY FIGURES

In 2019, thousands of families will be facing their fifth year as IDPs. Despite the hardships associated with this, majority of those surveyed indicated their intention to remain in displacement as Areas of Origin continue to lack security, services and social cohesion.

Number of IDP: 1,802,832

Number of Returnees: 4,165,320

Number of Syrian Refugees: 252,772

Number of Non-Syrian Refugees: 44,019

Number of Stateless: 47,630

Total Population of Concern: 6,312,573

KEY PRIORITIES & HIGHLIGHTS

- Approx. 6.7M people will require humanitarian assistance in 2019 according to 2019 HNO.
- Safe, dignified, and voluntary return of IDPs
- Improved quality of basic services and infrastructure
- Increased income-generating opportunities for sustained IDP returns.
- Only 9% of camp based IDPs plan to return to areas of origin by mid-2019, in the meanwhile the GoI closed 3 IDP camps which sheltered more than 12,000 people.
- **Facilitation, support and solving challenges for return of IDPs are the critical activities of 2019.**

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Relief actors are providing winter assistance to vulnerable populations across Iraq including shelter assistance and kerosene needed for winter heating. As of mid-Dec 18 relief actors had provided assistance to nearly 90,000 households, approx. 80 percent of the cluster's goal for the 2018/2019 winter season.

NATURAL DISASTERS


Additional to the late 2018 floods which affected at least 32,000 people in northwest and central Iraq, rainfall on 28 Jan 2019 caused flash flooding in Najaf Province, destroyed more than 50 homes in Al-Rahimiya Village. Priority needs are shelter, NFIs and food.

TOTAL POPULATION OF IRAQ


37M

PEOPLE IN NEED

6.7M



Population Figures Over Time



KEY HUMANITARIAN NEEDS

Protection and Livelihoods remains the overarching humanitarian priority for 2019.

- Many IDPs are still homeless or unable to return home because of what UNMAS calls “significant explosive hazard contamination” linked to airstrikes and improvised explosive devices left behind by IS. In Mosul alone, there is an estimated 7.6 million tonnes of debris from the fighting to make safe.
- “People need adequate housing and basic services, including drinking water and health care, as well as livelihood opportunities, security and the clearance of unexploded ordnance.” ICRC President Peter Maurer
- Approx. 2.5 million Iraqis require emergency food assistance, according to the 2019 HNO. Needs are greatest among camp-based IDPs and vulnerable host community members, particularly in Anbar, Diyala, Dohuk, Erbil, and Ninewa.
- An estimated 5.5 million people will require health assistance in the coming year, according to the 2019 HNO. Health services are severely under-equipped and understaffed. Psychosocial support is needed, especially among IDPs.
- Many health facilities have been damaged, looted or have lost their staff due to displacement. In Ninewa, Salaheddin and Anbar, 22 Public Health Centres were destroyed, and over a 101 partially damaged, affecting a third of the people in those governorates.

Sources:

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